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Blurred Lines: How to Rationally 
Understand the “Rational 
Understanding” Doctrine After  
Madison v. Alabama 
Abstract 
 
In Madison v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held that a capital inmate’s 
inability to remember his crime did not render him incompetent to be 
executed.  The Court reasoned that an individual who suffers from episodic 
memory loss may still “rationally understand” society’s reasons for 
sentencing him to death for a crime he once committed.  This Note explores 
the impact of memory loss on a person’s self-identity, and consequently 
challenges the notion that a capital inmate who no longer remembers his 
crime can truly have a rational understanding of it.  Specifically, this Note 
examines how memory loss substantially weakens the two main justifications 
the Court supplies for capital punishment.  First, execution of a defendant 
who no longer remembers his crime offers society less retribution because 
the person being punished lacks psychological continuity with the person 
who committed the crime.  Second, this change in identity calls into question 
the morality of execution in these circumstances because such a punishment 
may not be proportional to the crime committed.  Ultimately, this Note 
proposes that the Court adopt a categorical ban on capital punishment for 
those who cannot remember their crime, which will alleviate the burden 
placed on mental health professionals to determine whether an inmate can 
“rationally understand” his crime. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a person with vascular dementia who, day after day, becomes 
increasingly confused about his surroundings.1  This person has trouble 
performing everyday tasks such as getting dressed, brushing his teeth, or 
walking by himself.2  He cannot recite the alphabet, count by threes, or 
rephrase simple sentences.3  He is reported to have a “very substantial deficit 
in regard to working memory” and, due to the absence of effective 
treatments for regions of the brain damaged by a lack of blood flow, “there 
is little hope of stopping the disease or its progression.”4  But this person has 
also lived on death row for the past thirty years, and now his execution is 
imminent.5  Even though this person’s cognitive abilities have “sharply 
deteriorated,” when asked if he understands that the State wishes to execute 
him as punishment for crimes he committed in 1985, he answers in the 
affirmative.6  Yet, this defendant has no memory of committing the crimes 
that are described to him.7 
According to the recent holding of Madison v. Alabama, the Eighth 
Amendment does not protect this defendant from execution.8  Because he 
can understand that he once committed a crime, and that the State seeks 
retribution by executing him for committing that crime, this defendant is 
deemed competent to be executed.9 
In 1986, Ford v. Wainwright laid the groundwork for claims involving 
competency to be executed.10  Between 1986 and 2012, 5,724 individuals 
 
 1. Brief for the American Psychological Ass’n and American Psychiatric Ass’n as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Petitioner at 9, Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718 (2019) (No. 17-7505). 
 2. Id. at 9–10. 
 3. Id. at 10. 
 4. Id. at 9–10 (quoting ECF No. 8-3 at 17, Madison v. Dunn, No. CV 16-00191-KD-M, 2016 
2732193 (S.D. Ala. May 10, 2016)). 
 5. Madison, 139 S. Ct. at 723. 
 6. Id. at 723–24. 
 7. Id. at 723. 
 8. Id. at 731 (“[T]he Eighth Amendment may permit executing Madison even if he cannot 
remember committing his crime.”). 
 9. Id. at 731 (citing Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 958 (2007)) (“The sole question on 
which Madison’s competency depends is whether he can reach a ‘rational understanding’ of why the 
State wants to execute him.”). 
 10. 477 U.S. 399, 417 (1986) (“It is no less abhorrent today than it has been for centuries to exact 
in penance the life of one whose mental illness prevents him from comprehending the reasons for the 
penalty or its implications.”). 
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were sentenced to death.11  However, only 141 of those individuals filed 
Ford claims, arguing that mental illness prevented them from understanding 
the reasons for their executions.12  Only 21 of these claims were successful.13  
The scarcity of Ford claims is likely due to the vague language that the 
Supreme Court has used to define competency, which makes it difficult for 
attorneys to argue and prove incompetency on a case-by-case basis.14  The 
Supreme Court has framed the standard for a defendant’s competency to be 
executed as one of “rational understanding”—in other words, a defendant is 
competent to be executed if he can rationally understand the reason for his 
execution.15  Through Madison, the Court has made this competency 
standard even more elusive in application by holding that even defendants 
who have no memory of committing their crimes may still be considered 
competent to be executed.16 
While capital cases comprise a relatively small percentage of the 
criminal docket for most states,17 the gravity of their outcomes makes it 
 
 11. John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson & Katherine E. Ensler, Killing the Oblivious: An 
Empirical Study of Competency to be Executed Litigation, 82 UMKC L. REV. 335, 344 (2014). 
 12. Id. at 344.  Of the individuals who brought Ford claims during this time, over half had 
brought competency challenges earlier in the litigation.  Id. at 349.  What’s more, nearly a quarter of 
them “had previously been found incompetent to stand trial or proceed” in their cases.  Id.  Of 
course, this also means that those defendants were later found competent once again.  Id. at 349 n.69.  
However, this statistic works to refute the claim that Ford would result in a flurry of frivolous 
incompetency claims.  Id. at 352 (“[T]he Rehnquist/Burger fear of frivolous competency to be 
executed litigation has not materialized.”). 
 13. Id. at 344. 
 14. Id. at 355 (“Despite its vague contours, the Ford/Panetti standard is stringent in theory and 
very difficult to satisfy in practice.”); see also Carol S. Steiker, Panetti v. Quarterman: Is There a 
“Rational Understanding” of the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence?, 5 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 285, 288 (2007) (“Scott Panetti’s case raised questions about both [the substantive and 
procedural standards of claiming incompetence], but the Court’s opinion is notable for how little it 
manages to say in answering them.”). 
 15. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 958 (2007). 
 16. See Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718, 727 (2019).  Prior to Madison, some scholars 
seemed to believe the concepts of memory and rational understanding were intertwined.  See, e.g., 
Bruce Ebert, Competency to be Executed: A Proposed Instrument to Evaluate an Inmate’s Level of 
Competency in Light of the Eighth Amendment Prohibition Against the Execution of the Presently 
Insane, 25 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 29, 41 (2001) (“If a prisoner cannot remember or retain the 
reason for this punishment, or even the fact that he is going to be executed, then, clearly, he should 
be found incompetent for the purposes of execution.”). 
 17. See Gallup Poll—For First Time, Majority of Americans Prefer Life Sentence To Capital 
Punishment, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (NOV. 25, 2019) https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/ 
gallup-poll-for-first-time-majority-of-americans-prefer-life-sentence-to-capital-punishment.  This 
percentage continues to decline, as death sentences have decreased by fifty percent since 2010.  Id. 
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imperative that the judiciary correctly define the standard for competency.18  
This Note explores the holding of Madison v. Alabama and argues that the 
Court applied the “rational understanding” standard for competency to be 
executed too narrowly by deciding that memory loss alone has no effect on 
competency.19  Part II provides a brief overview of the death penalty’s 
reinstatement and the constitutional restrictions the Supreme Court has 
upheld for the execution of certain groups over time; it also addresses the 
key cases dealing with the effect of mental illness on competency to be 
executed.20  Part III discusses the facts of Madison and the Court’s reasoning 
in concluding that memory loss does not automatically preclude capital 
punishment unless it affects a defendant’s rational understanding of his 
crime and punishment.21  Part IV.A argues that the Court’s holding is 
inconsistent with the retributive value of capital punishment because an 
individual who loses his memory of a crime also loses his psychological 
connection to the crime and undergoes a change in identity.22  Part IV.B then 
asserts that no retributive value can be gained from punishing a different 
identity, and consequently, the punishment is disproportionate to the 
offense.23  Part V discusses the implications of Madison’s outcome, 
addresses concerns that this case even further disguises the true meaning of 
“rational understanding,” and proposes a categorical prohibition against 
executing a defendant who cannot remember his crime.24  Finally, Part VI 
concludes that memory of the crime is a quintessential element for a 
defendant to have a rational understanding of the reasons for his execution.25 
 
 18. See John L. Farringer IV, The Competency Conundrum: Problems Courts Have Faced in 
Applying Different Standards for Competency to be Executed, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2441, 2493 (2001) 
(“Time should be spent to ensure that the rule against executing the insane is being applied properly 
in actual cases.  State legislatures and the Supreme Court owe such an effort not just to prisoners 
facing death, but to a society yearning for a restored conscience.”).  Others have used even more 
extreme language to describe the need for more precise standards for execution.  See, e.g., Linda 
Malone, Too Ill to Be Killed: Mental and Physical Competency to Be Executed Pursuant to the 
Death Penalty, 51 TEX. TECH L. REV. 147, 167 (2018) (“[The death penalty’s] reinstatement in 
Gregg v. Georgia is a failed experiment with human life that has devolved into human 
experimentation in methods of execution of often feeble and otherwise impaired prisoners.”). 
 19. See infra Parts IV, V. 
 20. See infra Part II. 
 21. See infra Part III. 
 22. See infra Section IV.A. 
 23. See infra Section IV.B. 
 24. See infra Part V. 
 25. See infra Part VI. 
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II. HISTORY OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE COURTROOM 
A. The Death Penalty’s American Beginning and States’ Discretion 
The practice of capital punishment in America is as old as the country 
itself.26  Support for capital punishment and a perceived need for the 
institution is deep-rooted in America; however, equally deep-rooted is the 
criticism of the practice and the struggle for states to define its scope in light 
of the Eighth Amendment’s ban against cruel and unusual punishment.27  
Before 1976, states had complete discretion in molding the boundaries of 
capital punishment, and in turn, states left this issue largely in the hands of 
juries to determine whether a defendant’s conduct warranted capital 
punishment.28  The Supreme Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia put a 
stop to states’ discretion in imposing capital punishment and deemed the 
current state of the death penalty unconstitutional under the Eighth 
Amendment due to states’ arbitrary application of the punishment.29  States 
 
 26. See Betty B. Fletcher, The Death Penalty in America: Can Justice Be Done?, 70 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 811, 813–15 (1995) (explaining that America “inherited” England’s capital punishment regime 
and retained many of its intricacies). 
 27. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see also Fletcher, supra note 26, at 814–15 (“Since colonial 
times, there have been sporadic efforts to abolish the death penalty in the United States, and many 
individual states have repealed capital statutes.”). 
 28. See Daniel D. Polsby, The Death of Capital Punishment? Furman v. Georgia, 1972 SUP. CT. 
REV. 1, 4 (1972) (citing McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 197 (1971)) (“Justice Harlan [in a 
pre-1976 opinion] was convincing in arguing that juries should take the punishment decision under 
submission without standards to guide the determination: it should be done this way because it must 
be done this way.  Experience has shown that it is all but impossible ‘to identify before the fact those 
homicides for which the slayer should die.’”).  This allowance of state discretion reveals a recurring 
theme throughout this Note: courts’ avoidance of bright line rules and use of vague terms in death 
penalty jurisprudence is likely due to the difficulty in evaluating what characteristics make a human 
life fit for death as a matter of law.  See, e.g., id. at 26 (explaining that the Justices may have 
contradicted themselves in two Supreme Court rulings on the death penalty because “with twenty-
five score human lives in their hands, they were unable to appreciate the virtues of consistency”). 
 29. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).  Three defendants were sentenced to death, two 
under Georgia’s state procedures and the other under Texas’s.  Id. at 239.  The majority held that the 
imposition of the death penalty in these cases would violate the Eighth Amendment, with each 
Justice providing different reasoning for this conclusion through individual concurring opinions.  Id. 
at 239–40.  In sum, the concurring Justices took issue with the complete discretion states had 
previously possessed in imposing the death penalty, such as Justice Brennan, who believed “[i]t is a 
denial of human dignity for the State arbitrarily to subject a person to an unusually severe 
punishment that society has indicated it does not regard as acceptable.”  Id. at 286 (Brennan, J., 
concurring).  Chief Justice Burger, however, feared the majority’s approach stepped into the role of 
the legislative body, and he emphasized that “it is essential to our role as a court that we not seize 
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then struggled to refine their death penalty statutes to comply with the 
Eighth Amendment, and in turn, to evaluate what factual scenarios could 
legally justify execution of defendants.30  The Court did not see another 
death penalty case for another four years—the only four years in American 
history where no federally permissible means of execution existed.31 
B. Reaffirmation of the Death Penalty 
The Supreme Court reversed course in Gregg v. Georgia, where it 
addressed the constitutionality of the death penalty as a whole and, holding 
that capital punishment did “not invariably violate the Constitution,” 
attempted to clarify the proper role for capital punishment in light of the 
Eighth Amendment’s mandate against the infliction of cruel and unusual 
punishment.32  The Court began by exploring the case law that had guided 
interpretations of the Eighth Amendment “in a flexible and dynamic 
manner,” and concluded that at the very least, the Eighth Amendment 
required “that the punishment not be ‘excessive.’”33  The Court determined 
that two requirements must be met to successfully avoid excessive 
punishment: 1) “the punishment must not involve the unnecessary and 
wanton infliction of pain,” and 2) “the punishment must not be grossly out 
of proportion to the severity of the crime.”34  As long as these two tests were 
satisfied, the judiciary’s role in the imposition of the punishment was 
complete, and deference should be extended to the legislature as the 
representative of the people.35 
 
upon the enigmatic character of the guarantee as an invitation to enact our personal predilections into 
law.”  Id. at 376 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 30. See Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the 
Department of Justice’s Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 373 (1999) (“The immediate response to 
Furman was a short-lived movement toward statutes that eliminated all jury discretion by mandating 
imposition of a death penalty upon establishment of certain predicate facts.”). 
 31. See Thomas Adcock, A History of the Death Penalty in America, 36 CORNELL L.F. 6, 6 
(2010). 
 32. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976). 
 33. Id. at 171–73. 
 34. Id. at 173. 
 35. Id. at 175 (“We may not require the legislature to select the least severe penalty possible so 
long as the penalty selected is not cruelly inhumane or disproportionate to the crime involved.”).  But 
see Hugo Adam Bedau, Gregg v. Georgia and the “New” Death Penalty, 4 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 6 
(1985) (“Judicial intervention here does not entail judicial meddling with every other legislative 
choice in the penal code.  The question was never one of requiring states to impose the ‘least severe 
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The Court then looked to common law tradition and the contemporary 
views of American citizens for support of the death penalty, noting in 
particular that thirty-five states had attempted to rework their death penalty 
statutes to maintain their constitutionality in response to the Furman 
holding.36  The Court also relied on the retributive value of capital 
punishment, arguing that the instinct to seek retribution is a part of human 
nature, and it is the government’s duty to provide its people with access to 
retribution.37  The Court concluded that despite the death penalty’s 
uniqueness “in its severity and irrevocability,” the Court was required to 
hold, “in the absence of more convincing evidence, that the infliction of 
[death] as a punishment for murder is not without justification and thus is 
not unconstitutionally severe.”38 
C. Judicial Limitations on Who Is “Fit” for Capital Punishment 
Even in light of its reaffirmation of the death penalty, the Supreme 
Court has established that the Eighth Amendment’s meaning is not static and 
should instead adapt to society’s changing moral values.39  Accordingly, the 
Court has limited the application of the death penalty since Gregg, 
reexamining society’s view on the morality and retributive value of the death 
penalty under various circumstances.40 
The Court in Coker v. Georgia emphasized the importance of looking to 
state laws when evaluating the public’s view of what is morally acceptable.41  
In Coker, the defendant was sentenced to death for raping a woman after 
escaping a correctional facility where he was serving sentences for other 
crimes.42  The Court determined that “[a]t no time in the last 50 years have a 
 
penalty’; it was always only that of requiring them to impose the alternative, very severe penalty of 
long-term imprisonment . . . .”). 
 36. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 176–80. 
 37. Id. at 183 (“This function may be unappealing to many, but it is essential in an ordered 
society that asks its citizens to rely on legal processes rather than self-help to vindicate their 
wrongs.”). 
 38. Id. at 187. 
 39. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (“The Amendment must draw its meaning from 
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”). 
 40. See infra notes 41–55 and accompanying text. 
 41. 433 U.S. 584, 593 (1977) (looking to state laws in order to “seek guidance . . . from the 
objective evidence of the country’s present judgment concerning the acceptability of death as a 
penalty for rape of an adult woman”). 
 42. Id. at 587. 
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majority of the States authorized death as a punishment for rape,” and the 
overall judgment of state legislatures “weigh[ed] very heavily on the side of 
rejecting capital punishment as a suitable penalty for raping an adult 
woman.”43  The Court concluded that while the crime of rape is 
“reprehensible . . . it does not compare with murder, which does involve the 
unjustified taking of human life.”44  It emphasized that a punishment of 
death is disproportionate to a crime that does not involve death, even if the 
defendant has had prior convictions for murder.45 
The Court applied similar reasoning in Enmund v. Florida to a prisoner 
who was convicted for acting as an accomplice to felony murder.46  Again 
looking to state law to gauge the public’s opinion, the Court concluded that 
“only about a third of American jurisdictions would ever permit a defendant 
who somehow participated in a robbery where a murder occurred to be 
sentenced to die.”47  Thus, it held that execution was an excessive penalty 
for one “who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing 
take place or that lethal force will be employed,” and therefore does not 
cause “an affront to humanity.”48  Turning to the retributive value of 
executing an accomplice of felony murder, the Court emphasized that the 
focus must be on the accomplice’s individual culpability, meaning it must 
analyze the “relevant facets of the character and record of the individual 
offender.”49  The Court concluded that no retributive end is served by 
executing an individual who does not share the “personal responsibility and 
moral guilt” of the actual murderer.50 
Most recently, the Court held in Roper v. Simmons that the Eighth 
Amendment does not allow for the execution of juvenile offenders under 
eighteen years of age.51  The Court again determined that objective factors 
 
 43. Id. at 593, 596. 
 44. Id. at 597–98. 
 45. Id. at 599. 
 46. 458 U.S. 782, 788–89 (1982) (noting the objective approach of the Coker Court and 
endeavoring “to analyze the punishment at issue in this case in a similar manner”). 
 47. Id. at 792. 
 48. Id. at 797. 
 49. Id. at 798 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)). 
 50. Id. at 801 (holding that execution of an individual who did not intend to commit murder 
“does not measurably contribute to the retributive end of ensuring that the criminal gets his just 
deserts”). 
 51. 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005). 
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weigh against execution of this category of individuals.52  It found that 
youths do not have the same level of culpability as adults because youths are 
more susceptible “to immature and irresponsible behavior,” and thus a crime 
committed by a minor is not necessarily “evidence of irretrievably depraved 
character.”53  The Court reasoned that “the case for retribution is not as 
strong with a minor as with an adult” because “[o]nce the diminished 
culpability of juveniles is recognized, it is evident that the penological 
justifications for the death penalty apply to them with lesser force than to 
adults.”54  Thus, the Court concluded that execution of juvenile offenders is 
unconstitutional.55 
These cases reflect a pattern of two core values that the Court upholds 
when considering how the Eighth Amendment restricts capital punishment.56  
First, the continued culpability of the defendant is essential to serve the 
death penalty’s retributive values, which means that the Court must 
singularly focus on the character and identity of the capital defendant.57  
Second, capital punishment is justified only where the crime that was 
committed is equal to the punishment in both severity and permanence.58 
Defendants who lose their memory of the crime they committed 
 
 52. Id. at 567 (“[T]he objective indicia of consensus in this case—the rejection of the juvenile 
death penalty in the majority of States; the infrequency of its use even where it remains on the 
books; and the consistency in the trend toward abolition of the practice—provide sufficient evidence 
that today our society views juveniles . . . as ‘categorically less culpable than the average criminal.’” 
(quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002))). 
 53. Id. at 570; see also id. (“From a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings 
of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies 
will be reformed.”). 
 54. Id. at 571.  The Court also expressed concern that the diminished culpability of a juvenile 
defendant might be overlooked by a jury where the details of a brutal or heinous crime were also 
presented, even though the defendant’s immaturity or vulnerability should properly call for a lesser 
sentence.  Id. at 572–73.  It emphasized the difficulty that even expert psychiatrists face in 
distinguishing “between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient 
immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”  Id. at 573.  
The Court concluded that “[i]f trained psychiatrists with the advantage of clinical testing” hesitate to 
make such a distinction, “States should refrain from asking jurors to issue a far graver 
condemnation—that a juvenile offender merits the death penalty.”  Id. 
 55. Id. at 571. 
 56. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. 
 57. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 570; Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982). 
 58. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 
(1976)) (“We have the abiding conviction that the death penalty, which ‘is unique in its severity and 
irrevocability,’ is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human life.”); 
Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797. 
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undergo a change in identity as a result, which lessens their degree of 
culpability.59  Consequently, the retributive value of executing this class of 
individuals is questionable, and therefore the severity of the punishment is 
likely disproportionate to the crime.60  The Supreme Court’s “rational 
understanding” standard for capital punishment involving mentally ill 
defendants, however, has allowed this class of individuals to slip through its 
cracks.61 
D. The Rise of the “Rational Understanding” Doctrine for Mentally Ill 
Capital Prisoners 
Changing societal values have led the Court to recognize another 
limitation on capital punishment.62  The Court has limited the execution of 
“mentally incompetent” prisoners by analyzing the same rationales as cases 
involving other classes of prisoners—morality and retributive value.63  
Perhaps the most influential case to address the use of the death penalty on 
the mentally incompetent was Ford v. Wainwright, where the Court 
conclusively held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of an 
insane prisoner.64  The Court again considered “objective evidence of 
contemporary values” but began its analysis by considering common law 
justifications for barring execution of the insane.65  Notably, the Court 
quoted Blackstone for the proposition that “if, after judgment, [a man] 
becomes of nonsane memory, execution shall be stayed: for peradventure, 
says the humanity of the English law, had the prisoner been of sound 
 
 59. For a more in-depth explanation of why this is the case, see infra Section IV.A. 
 60. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (“When the choice is between life and death, 
th[e] risk [that a court might impose a disproportionate sentence] is unacceptable and incompatible 
with the commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”). 
 61. See generally Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718, 729 (2019) (“But delusions come in 
many shapes and sizes, and not all will interfere with the understanding that the Eighth Amendment 
requires.”). 
 62. See infra notes 63–84 and accompanying text. 
 63. See supra notes 41–55 and accompanying text. 
 64. 477 U.S. 399, 409–10 (1986).  Alvin Ford was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in 
1974.  Id. at 401.  It was undisputed that Ford was competent at the time of his crime, at trial, and 
sentencing.  Id.  In 1982, however, Ford’s personality began to change, and he began to suffer from 
severe delusions.  Id. at 402.  Three psychiatrists evaluated Ford’s competency and all three came to 
different conclusions as to the extent to which he could understand his current situation, but the 
Governor of Florida nevertheless signed Ford’s death warrant without explanation.  Id. at 403–04. 
 65. Id. at 406–08. 
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memory, he might have alleged something in stay of judgment or 
execution.”66  This proposition became the foundation of the common law 
analysis of capital punishment for mentally ill defendants.67 
The Court observed that with respect to the common law prohibition of 
putting the insane to death, “the reasons for the rule are less sure and less 
uniform than the rule itself.”68  This is because scholars have developed 
various explanations over time: some have argued that execution of the 
insane “simply offends humanity,” while others have noted the lack of 
deterrent value in executing insane criminals because “it provides no 
example to others.”69  More recently, scholars have expressed doubt “that 
the community’s quest for ‘retribution’” is served by executing the mentally 
incompetent.70  Nevertheless, the Court concluded that “[w]hether its aim be 
to protect the condemned from fear and pain without comfort of 
understanding, or to protect the dignity of society itself from the barbarity of 
exacting mindless vengeance, the restriction finds enforcement in the Eighth 
Amendment.”71 
The Court further clarified what it means to be “mentally competent” in 
Panetti v. Quarterman, recognizing that Ford “did not set forth a precise 
standard for competency.”72  In Panetti, the defendant had been prescribed 
medication for his mental disorders that “would be difficult for a person not 
suffering from extreme psychosis even to tolerate,” and during trial, the 
defendant engaged in “‘bizarre,’ ‘scary,’ and ‘trance-like’” behavior.73  
There was evidence that the defendant stopped taking his medication prior to 
trial, and “the state trial court found him incompetent to waive the 
 
 66. Id. at 406–07 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24–25). 
 67. See id. at 408–09 (“It is clear that the ancient and humane limitation upon the State’s ability 
to execute its sentences has as firm a hold upon the jurisprudence of today as it had centuries ago in 
England.”). 
 68. Id. at 407. 
 69. Id. at 407–08 (citing 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES 6 (6th ed. 1680)). 
 70. Id. at 408; see also Joan P. Cafone, Execution of the Insane, 5 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 433, 
436 (1988) (“[A]lthough many explanations have been offered, there is no general agreement as to 
why there should be a rule proscribing the execution of mentally incompetent capital inmates.  
Indeed, some commentators observe that the uneasiness over invoking the insanity exemption may 
represent deeper public misgivings about the death penalty itself.”). 
 71. Ford, 477 U.S. at 410. 
 72. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 957 (2007).  The defendant was convicted of murder 
and sentenced to death in 1995.  Id. at 937. 
 73. Id. at 936. 
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appointment of state habeas counsel.”74  Expert testimony further revealed 
that the defendant believed the state’s express reason for executing him was 
a “sham,” and the state truly wished to execute him to “stop him from 
preaching.”75  Nevertheless, the district court found that the defendant was 
competent to be executed.76  The circuit court affirmed, relying on three 
findings: 1) the defendant was “aware that he committed the murders,” 2) 
the defendant was “aware that he [would] be executed,” and 3) the defendant 
was “aware that the reason the State ha[d] given for the execution [was] his 
commission of the crimes in question.”77 
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment, holding that 
the standard set forth in the lower courts was “too restrictive to afford a 
prisoner the protections granted by the Eighth Amendment.”78  Considering 
the retributive justification for the death penalty, the Court stated “that 
capital punishment is imposed because it has the potential to make the 
offender recognize at last the gravity of his crime” and affirms society’s 
judgment that the defendant’s culpability is so severe “that the ultimate 
penalty must be sought and imposed.”79  The Court reasoned that “[t]he 
potential for a prisoner’s recognition of the severity of the offense and the 
objective of community vindication” is inhibited when a defendant’s mental 
condition causes an inability to connect “his awareness of the crime and 
punishment” to “the understanding of those concepts shared by the 
community as a whole.”80 
Thus, the Court concluded that while Ford did not construct a precise 
definition for “mental incompetency,” the general principles that the Court’s 
holding alluded to were not served by the state’s law that emphasized a 
defendant’s understanding of the expressed reason for the execution rather 
than the defendant’s subjective belief about why the execution is taking 
 
 74. Id. at 936–37. 
 75. Id. at 954–55. 
 76. Id. at 956. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 956–57, 962. 
 79. Id. at 958; see also Gerald H. Gottlieb, Testing the Death Penalty, 34 S. CAL. L. REV. 268, 
274 (1961) (“The ethics of republican government lead us to the conclusion that punishment shall 
not be meted which inflicts pain or loss without necessity.”); see also Cafone, supra note 70, at 461 
(“Capital punishment, as the most severe and irremediable form of punishment imposed, is intended 
to be utilized only where serious offenses have been committed and where few mitigating factors are 
present.”). 
 80. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 958–59. 
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place.81  Further, the Court emphasized that “[a] prisoner’s awareness of the 
State’s rationale for an execution is not the same as a rational understanding 
of it.”82  However, the Court noted “that a concept like rational 
understanding is difficult to define,” and it refrained from attempting “to set 
down a rule governing all competency determinations.”83  Thus, the rational 
understanding standard left the meaning of competency to be executed as 
ambiguous as before.84 
III. MADISON’S CASE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND MEMORY LOSS 
Unsurprisingly, this ambiguity resurfaced in Madison v. Alabama.85  
Vernon Madison was sentenced to death in 1985 for killing a police 
officer,86 and he has spent the remainder of his life since then on death row.87  
After suffering from major strokes in 2015 and 2016, Madison was 
diagnosed with vascular dementia, and consequently was unable to 
remember “committing the crime for which he [had] been sentenced to 
die.”88  Consequently, Madison petitioned “for a stay of his execution on the 
ground that he” was no longer mentally competent, “argu[ing] that ‘he no 
longer underst[ood]’ the ‘status of his case’ or the ‘nature of his conviction 
and sentence.’”89  The State rebutted, arguing that regardless of what 
Madison remembered, he satisfied the Ford and Panetti standards for 
 
 81. Id. at 959. 
 82. Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 960 (“Gross delusions stemming from a severe mental 
disorder may put an awareness of a link between a crime and its punishment in a context so far 
removed from reality that the punishment can serve no proper purpose.”). 
 83. Id. at 959–61. 
 84. See Steiker, supra note 14, at 300 (concluding that “Panetti brings us no closer” to a genuine 
understanding of what constitutes competency to be executed, but rather  “it illuminates some of the 
difficulties that await”). 
 85. 139 S. Ct. 718, 726–27 (2019). 
 86. Id. at 723.  This Note, along with the case itself, accepts as true that Madison was guilty and 
deserving of capital punishment at the time he initially committed the crime and was initially 
convicted.  See id. at 723.  However, this Note proceeds under the notion that the extent of a 
defendant’s culpability can change over time depending on the circumstances that a defendant is 
confronted with.  See Christopher Birch, Memory and Punishment, 19 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 17, 29 
(2000) (“[T]he offender’s deserving punishment is not something determined once and for all 
immediately after the commission of a crime, but it is something that must be sustained until the 
punishment has been completed.”). 
 87. Madison, 139 S. Ct. at 723. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
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competency because he could rationally understand the reason for his 
execution sentence.90 
Both Madison and the State introduced expert testimony to support their 
arguments regarding Madison’s mental competency.91  Madison’s expert 
reported “that although Madison ‘underst[ood] the nature of execution’ in 
the abstract, he did not comprehend the ‘reasoning behind’ Alabama’s effort 
to execute him.’”92  Conversely, the State’s expert found that Madison did 
not appear to be delusional, and therefore, he could comprehend his legal 
situation.93  The trial court ultimately found Madison competent to be 
executed in light of the State’s expert testimony, holding that Madison 
appeared to have a rational understanding of his punishment and why he 
would suffer it, and did not appear delusional.94  After seeking habeas 
review in federal court, the Eleventh Circuit held that Madison had shown 
indisputable error in the state court’s ruling.95  The Supreme Court reversed 
the circuit court, however, and held that the trial court did not clearly err in 
concluding that Madison was competent to be executed.96 
After the state set an execution date, Madison returned to state court and 
again argued that his mental state prohibited his execution.97  The state court, 
citing Ford and Panetti, again found Madison competent for execution, and 
the Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari for direct review of the 
state court’s decision.98  The Court presented three issues for review: 1) 
“whether Panetti prohibits executing Madison merely because he cannot 
remember committing his crime,”99 2) “whether Panetti[ ]permits executing 
 
 90. Id. at 723–24. 
 91. Id. at 724. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 724–25. 
 95. Id. at 725. 
 96. Id. (citing Dunn v. Madison, 138 S. Ct. 9, 12 (2017)).  Because habeas petitions are subject to 
the deferential standard set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), the 
Court emphasized that its holding was limited to this deferential context.  Id.  The Court declined to 
make any determination of Madison’s competency under a non-deferential standard.  Id. 
 97. Id.  While Madison reiterated the same facts and arguments that he had previously made to 
the state court, he additionally argued that his mental state had worsened, and asserted that the 
State’s expert from the original trial had since lost his license to practice psychology.  Id. 
 98. Id. at 726.  Because the Court was now directly reviewing the state court’s decision, the 
deferential AEDPA standard no longer applied.  Id. 
 99. Id.  The Court stated that Madison conceded this point at oral argument, where he agreed 
with Chief Justice Roberts that “simply blacking out” without any evidence of a mental disorder is 
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Madison merely because he suffers from dementia, rather than psychotic 
delusions,”100 and 3) whether, applying the answers to these questions to 
Madison’s case, his execution could proceed.101 
Addressing the first issue, the Court held that someone who has genuine 
memory loss but “remains oriented in time and place” and “comprehends 
familiar concepts of crime and punishment” may still satisfy the standard for 
mental competency under Ford and Panetti.102  The Court reasoned that 
Panetti emphasizes “understanding, not memory” and concluded that “one 
may exist without the other.”103  The Court analogized remembering one’s 
crime to remembering the Civil War or one’s first day of school to clarify 
the distinction: while an “independent recollection” may not exist in either 
case, it is still possible to understand that those events occurred.104  Thus, the 
Court held that a defendant who does not remember his crime may still be 
 
insufficient to satisfy the Ford standard of incompetency.  Id. (“But at this Court, Madison accepted 
Alabama’s position on the first issue.”); Transcript of Oral Argument at 11, Madison, 139 S. Ct. 718 
(No. 17-7505).  However, Madison’s counsel quickly clarified that this concession was rooted in the 
evidentiary difficulties associated with proving memory loss.  Transcript of Oral Argument, at 12 
(“[W]e recognize that it’s too easy for any offender to say ‘I don’t remember.’  Defendants at trial 
often use defenses of ‘I don’t remember.’  It doesn’t preclude the state from trying them, from 
convicting them, from sentencing them.”).  For further discussion of the distinction between true 
memory loss and mere claims of memory loss that are never brought to bear, see infra notes 229–
232 and accompanying text. 
 100. Madison, 139 S. Ct. at 726.  The Court also noted that the State conceded this point at oral 
argument.  Id.  During the argument, counsel for the State admitted that “if someone has vascular 
dementia or any other mental illness, if it precludes them from having a rational understanding of 
their punishment, and that they will die when they’re executed, they would meet the Ford [sic] and 
Panetti [sic] standard.”  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 99, at 36. 
 101. Madison, 139 S. Ct. at 729.  The dissent argued that the Court should not have heard this case 
at all, because the petition for certiorari only addressed the first two issues that the parties conceded.  
Id. at 731–38 (Alito, J., dissenting).  Justice Alito stated that “there [was] no inkling” in the petition 
of the argument that the state court’s decision was based on an erroneous view of the law, and he 
suggested “that the real reason for [the] decision [was] doubt on the part of the majority regarding 
the correctness of the state court’s factual finding.”  Id. at 734, 738 (Alito, J., dissenting).  However, 
the majority rejected this reasoning, presumably on the ground that resolution of the issues in the 
petition necessarily involved review of the state court’s competency analysis and, because of the 
change in the standard of review now that AEDPA no longer applied, the Court’s “decision on 
Madison’s habeas petition [could not] help resolve the questions raised here.”  Id. at 726. 
 102. Id. at 727. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. (“Do you have an independent recollection of the Civil War?  Obviously not.  But you 
may still be able to reach a rational—indeed, a sophisticated—understanding of that conflict and its 
consequences.  Do you recall your first day of school?  Probably not.  But if your mother told you 
years later that you were sent home for hitting a classmate, you would have no trouble grasping the 
story.”). 
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competent to be executed if he nevertheless understands why he is to be 
punished.105 
The Court justified its reasoning by finding that its conclusion was 
consistent with the framing Panetti set out in its Eighth Amendment inquiry, 
which concerned the retributive and moral values involved in execution.106  
Panetti found that retributive value stems from appreciation of “the meaning 
of a community’s judgment,” and here the Court found that “a person who 
can no longer remember a crime may yet recognize the retributive message 
society intends to convey with a death sentence.”107  Likewise, while the 
Ford and Panetti Courts concluded that it “‘offends humanity’ to execute a 
person so wracked by mental illness that he cannot comprehend the 
‘meaning and purpose of the punishment,’” this Court found that the 
“offense to morality must be much less when a person’s mental disorder 
causes nothing more than an episodic memory loss.”108  Thus, the Court 
concluded that retribution is still served and moral values are not upended by 
executing a defendant who cannot remember his crime.109 
Addressing the second issue, the Court held that while memory loss 
alone is insufficient to satisfy the Panetti standard, psychotic delusions are 
not necessary to qualify an individual as mentally incompetent.110  The Court 
reasoned that the standard concerns a lack of rational understanding of the 
community’s judgment, regardless of the cause of such a condition.111  
Moreover, the Court determined that the justifications set forth in Ford and 
Panetti supported this conclusion because those justifications were also 
concerned with the effect of incomprehension rather than its cause.112  The 
Court suggested that dementia would implicate Eighth Amendment concerns 
if, for example, a person was incapable of retaining any memories such that 
“even newly gained knowledge” was “quickly forgotten,” or if “cognitive 
deficits prevent the acquisition of such knowledge at all, so that memory 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. (citing Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 958–59 (2007)). 
 108. Id. (“Moral values do not exempt the simply forgetful from punishment, whatever the 
neurological reason for their lack of recall.”). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 728. 
 111. Id. (“Psychosis or dementia, delusions or overall cognitive decline are all the same under 
Panetti, so long as they produce the requisite lack of comprehension.”). 
 112. Id. at 729 (“[I]f and when [a] failure of understanding is present, the rationales kick in . . . .”). 
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gaps go forever uncompensated.”113 
Turning to the third issue—the mental competency of Madison 
himself—the Court held that remand was necessary because it was unclear 
whether the state court had found him competent under the erroneous 
assumption that only delusional states satisfied the Panetti standard.114  The 
Court held that while the original decision evaluating Madison’s competency 
stated that Madison had a rational understanding of his sentence, the more 
recent evaluation that the Court was reviewing did not incorporate that 
language.115  Further, the original decision emphasized Madison’s lack of 
delusions without discussing his dementia.116  Thus, the Court remanded the 
case to the state court and, because much of the original expert testimony 
and reporting relied on erroneous interpretations of the law, instructed the 
court to supplement the record as necessary.117 
IV. THE RETRIBUTIVE AND MORAL VALUE OF EXECUTING THOSE WHO 
DON’T REMEMBER 
The Court’s reading of the rational understanding requirement 
unnecessarily narrows the application of the Panetti standard.118  Rational 
understanding of the community’s reason for its judgment is undoubtedly a 
key requirement under the Eighth Amendment.119  However, rational 
understanding is not as restrictive of a standard as it might appear, 
particularly when comparing understanding of one’s crimes to understanding 
the Civil War.120  In order to evaluate the constitutionality of executing 
 
 113. Id. at 727–28. 
 114. Id. at 729–31. 
 115. Id. at 730. 
 116. Id. at 730–31. 
 117. Id. at 731 (emphasizing that the state court must ensure “that if [Madison] is to be executed, 
he understands why”). 
 118. See infra Parts IV, V. 
 119. See J. D. Feltham, The Common Law and the Execution of Insane Criminals, 4. MELB. U.L. 
REV. 434, 468 (1964) (“[P]erhaps the most convincing purpose for which the rule [against execution 
of the insane] has been said to exist in modern circumstances is that punishment should not be 
inflicted upon a person incapable of comprehending the reason why he is punished.”). 
 120. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 959 (2007) (“[A] concept like rational 
understanding is difficult to define.”); Jules L. Coleman, Rational Choice and Rational Cognition, 3 
LEG. 183, 198 (1997) (“Davidsonian considerations do not appear to establish psychological 
rationality—that is, the very different claim that agents are rational.  Rational-choice theory (and 
rationalistic theories generally) require the psychological, not the epistemological, sense of 
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criminals who do not remember their crimes, a further inquiry into the two 
justifications provided in Madison is necessary—retributive value and moral 
offense.121  Due to the identity shift and psychological disconnect that 
memory loss causes, the execution of defendants who cannot remember their 
crimes does not satisfy retributive values and consequently is an excessive 
punishment.122 
A. Retributive Value: Memory Loss and Punishment 
In considering retributive value, the Panetti Court began with the 
premise that “capital punishment is imposed because it has the potential to 
make the offender recognize at last the gravity of his crime . . . .”123  Thus, 
the individual’s ability to connect the meaning of the crime with the 
meaning and the purpose behind the punishment is essential to satisfying 
retributive ends.124  This connection is never fully realized, however, if the 
individual has no recollection of committing the crime and therefore can 
only ever view the crime in the abstract.125 
 
rationality.”). 
 121. Madison, 139 S. Ct. at 727.  These values are often included in discussions about 
justifications of the death penalty, and often the discussions of these two values are intertwined with 
one another.  See Mary Ellen Gale, Retribution, Punishment, and Death, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 973, 
979 (1985) (“[E]ven though crime control may be a primary purpose of punishment, only retribution 
can ultimately justify punishment.”); see also id. at 1006 (“Desert is centrally important in answering 
not only the secondary question, ‘whom may we punish?’ but also the primary questions, ‘why do 
we punish?’ and ‘why is it (if it is) moral or just or right for us to do so?’”).  However, this Note will 
discuss these two values individually.  See infra Sections IV.A, IV.B. 
 122. See infra Sections IV.A, IV.B. 
 123. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 958. 
 124. See Gale, supra note 121, at 1005 (“If a person’s chance of receiving punishment does not 
relate to her own conduct, she has no incentive to forego the possibility of any perceived gain that 
might accrue from breaking the criminal laws.”); see also Douglas N. Husak, Retribution in 
Criminal Theory, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 959, 979–80 (2000) (“Consider . . . a case in which a person 
engages in immoral conduct that he believes to be criminal.  He subsequently discovers, much to his 
surprise and relief, that his conduct was not proscribed by an existing criminal statute after all.  In 
such a case, one might think that the weight to be given to the principle of legality might be 
insufficient to override the value of realizing retributive justice.”). 
 125. See O. Carter Snead, Memory and Punishment, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1195, 1256–57 (2011) 
(“Modifying memory neurobiologically seriously complicates [the goal of retributive justice] by 
preventing access to accurate accounts of the crime, or by preventing authentic emotions (felt in the 
appropriate degree) integral to appraising culpability, such as . . . empathy . . . .”); see also Birch, 
supra note 86, at 27 (“What we value about a contrite individual is not merely her regret at having 
committed the offense but her regret about the type of person she was and the life she led prior to 
committing the offense.  Radical memory loss deprives individuals of the internal mental knowledge 
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In understanding the connection between an offender’s crime and the 
community’s judgment of capital punishment, the offender’s ability to retain 
episodic memory of the crime is essential.126  Episodic memory is the faculty 
that allows individuals to remember events in sequence as if they are 
reliving the experience in real time.127  Retaining an emotional memory of 
the crime, which is distinct from episodic memory, is also crucial.128  To 
illustrate the relevance and intersection of episodic and emotional memory 
in the context of crime and punishment, one scholar proposed various 
hypothetical situations where an offender’s memory is manipulated.129 
Case 1 involves a defendant who robs a convenience store, kills the 
store clerk, and is later sentenced to death.130  The defendant is able to reflect 
on his own unfortunate upbringing as well as his actions’ effect on the 
victim’s family and community.131  Consequently, the defendant is able to 
construct—and the jury is able to appreciate—his mitigation case out of 
genuine sorrow and remorse.132  In Case 2, however, the defendant commits 
the same crime but is later affected by “anterograde amnesia,” which wipes 
out his memory of the crime, and therefore he “finds it difficult to reflect on 
the details of the crime to generate a sense of empathy in himself for the 
victim, and, by extension, remorse.”133  Finally, in Case 3 the defendant 
commits a crime under the influence of a drug that allows him to remember 
the facts of the crime but blocks out any memories of shame or pain, which 
 
of those aspects of their past that form the background and prelude to their criminal acts.”). 
 126. See Snead, supra note 125, at 1205 (“[Episodic memory] is arguably the richest form of 
memory and is certainly most directly relevant to the relationship between memory and 
punishment.”). 
 127. See MICHAEL E. HASSELMO, HOW WE REMEMBER: BRAIN MECHANISMS OF EPISODIC 
MEMORY 1 (2013) (“Like the snow under my feet, my episodic memory retained mental footprints 
showing where I faced, where I turned, and even how fast I moved.”). 
 128. See Snead, supra note 125, at 1218 (discussing a study that revealed that emotional memories 
“exist in a seamlessly integrated fashion with [episodic] memories, adding affective content that 
deeply influences how such [episodic] memories are understood and experienced”). 
 129. Id. at 1251–54.  The author describes the interplay between episodic and emotional memory 
as remembering “fitly and truly.”  Id. at 1246.  Remembering “fitly” requires that a memory “be 
animated by a morally appropriate sentiment” and given an appropriate weight, while remembering 
“truly” requires recalling the facts and events as they occurred.  Id. 
 130. Id. at 1251. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 1252. 
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leaves his claim for mitigation without “a truly felt element of regret.”134 
Case 1 poses no threat to achieving retributive justice because the 
defendant maintained full mental capacity throughout the execution of his 
crime and implementation of his punishment, recognized the mental state he 
was in that led him to committing his crime, and was, therefore, able to take 
full advantage of all the litigation tactics that due process afforded him.135  
Case 2, however, raises more complex questions about the defendant’s 
“personal identity” when he committed the crime and the defendant’s 
identity when he is later punished for it.136  In Case 3, the defendant 
remembers the crime “truly” but not “fitly” and thus, his lack of emotional 
connection between the crime he committed and the punishment that the 
community seeks detracts from the punishment’s retributive value.137 
As these cases demonstrate, the reason that a lack of “episodic” or 
“emotional” memory presents a challenge to the punishment’s retributive 
value is that these memories make people who they are.138  When an 
individual loses his memory of an important event, his consciousness is 
disrupted and his identity is inherently changed.139  This is because a 
 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 1254.  Retribution focuses on who is punished for crimes because it “forbids 
punishment of those individuals who have done no wrong.”  Id.  Because the defendant in Case 1 
does not undergo an appreciable change in mental state between the crime and the punishment, there 
is no question that the person who committed the crime is the “same” as the person who is punished 
for it.  Id. 
 136. Id. at 1246, 1254–55 (arguing that the defendant’s ability to remember “truly” is inhibited, 
and thus the “psychological continuity” between the person who committed the crime and the person 
being punished is challenged). 
 137. Id. at 1246, 1255 (“Without such a fitting memory, the defendant is unable to grasp fully the 
horror of his own acts.  This poses an obstacle to empathy, and thus remorse.  This complicates the 
task of punishing in a way that tracks culpability.”). 
 138. See Birch, supra note 86, at 18 (describing existence as nothing more than “a chain of mental 
experiences” and a “sequence of mental states” that extends backward).  This is known as the 
“reductive theory of mind,” which “claims that the existence of a person is merely a conventional 
way of identifying [the] patterns of human mental experience” that each human refers to as his 
“self.”  Id.  Thus, when a person forgets some of those experiences or previous mental states, the 
whole “notion of [the] person” is compromised.  Id. at 18–19. 
 139. See Birch, supra note 86, at 18–19.  Birch describes psychological experiments that involved 
severing the connection between the left and right hemispheres of epileptic patients’ brains.  Id. at 
19.  This separation created “two separate spheres of consciousness, in effect two minds within the 
one brain,” such that the patients could no longer perform tasks that involved both hemispheres 
working together.  Id.  This experiment begs the question: if the experiment created a division of 
consciousness, “[w]hat happened to the personal identity of the patient that existed prior to the 
operation?”  Id. 
[Vol. 48: 497, 2021] Blurred Lines 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
518 
person’s identity, at its core, is composed of the different memories and 
thoughts a person has, and the continuing “psychological connectedness” of 
those thoughts and ideas.140  Thus, a loss of memory leads to psychological 
discontinuity, and therefore, a change in identity.141  Retribution is rooted in 
a particular individual receiving a punishment that he or she deserves for 
committing a wrong.142  Therefore, the punishment’s retributive value 
disappears when a defendant suffers from memory loss because the person 
who the government punishes no longer has the same identity as the person 
who committed the crime.143 
The case law surrounding capital punishment emphasizes the 
importance of exacting punishment only on the person who committed the 
crime and, in the past, justified the central reason for identifying capital 
punishment as “cruel and unusual” in certain contexts.144  In Enmund, for 
example, the Court refused to consider the culpability of an individual who 
committed felony murder when determining whether or not an individual 
who simply assisted in the felony should be sentenced to death.145  Similarly, 
in determining that the execution of offenders under eighteen years of age 
violates the Eighth Amendment, the Roper Court focused on the changing 
 
 140. See Rebecca Dresser, Personal Identity and Punishment, 70 B.U. L. REV. 395, 399 (1990) 
(describing the view that “a person’s continued existence over time consists of two general relations, 
psychological connectedness and psychological continuity”).  Psychological connectedness requires 
connections between a person’s memory at one time and another.  Id.  “For example, today I 
remember the lilacs on a walk yesterday.  A direct psychological connection exists between this 
experience and my present memory of it. . . .  To be the same person today and yesterday, there must 
be enough direct connections.”  Id. 
 141. See 1 JOHN LOCKE, Of Identity and Diversity, in AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN 
UNDERSTANDING 439, 449 (Alexander Campbell Fraser ed., 1959) (1689) (“[A]s far as [a particular] 
consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of 
that person.”). 
 142. See Gale, supra note 121, at 999 (“Retribution focuses not on improvement of society but 
rather on just treatment of the individual.”). 
 143. See Birch, supra note 86, at 20 (“If our concept of a person is a construction by which we 
bundle and label certain human experiences, but does not describe any additional or deep fact 
beyond those experiences, then we appear to lose any good reason for suggesting why this bundle of 
experiences here and now deserves to suffer punishment for something done by another bundle of 
experiences at a previous time.”). 
 144. See infra notes 145–148 and accompanying text. 
 145. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (“Enmund did not kill or intend to kill and thus 
his culpability is plainly different from that of the robbers who killed; yet the State treated them alike 
and attributed to Enmund the culpability of those who killed the Kerseys.  This was impermissible 
under the Eighth Amendment.”). 
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identity of young adults and its effect on their moral culpability.146  It 
emphasized that even the most heinous crimes, when committed by juveniles 
whose characters and identities are subject to change, may not be justified 
under the Eighth Amendment.147  These cases demonstrate that the 
consistency of the offender’s identity is an essential factor in determining the 
retributive value of capital punishment, and thus, when an offender’s 
identity is shifted via memory loss, the retributive value of such an execution 
is greatly diminished.148 
Once the consistency of an offender’s identity is called into question, 
the retributive justification for the death penalty begins to unravel because 
retribution occurs when a balance is struck between the offender and the 
injured party.149  While an offender who does not remember committing a 
crime might be able, as the Madison Court recognized, to “rationally” 
understand the crime in the same way he might understand the events of the 
Civil War, he will likely never be able to connect his own identity to those 
acts.150  Thus, the offender will not “recognize at last the gravity of his 
crime[s],” and society must then cope with another unjustified killing and an 
unfulfilled desire for retribution.151 
 
 146. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570–71 (2005) (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 
815, 835 (1988)) (explaining that a difference between juveniles and adults “is that the character of a 
juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult,” and therefore “their irresponsible conduct is not as 
morally reprehensible as that of an adult”). 
 147. Id. at 570 (“The reality that juveniles still struggle to define their identity means it is less 
supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of 
irretrievably depraved character.  From a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the 
failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character 
deficiencies will be reformed.”). 
 148. See supra notes 138–147 and accompanying text; see also Birch, supra note 86, at 27 (“By 
virtue of my character, personality, knowledge, dispositions, and memories of my life generally, I 
could have maintained a high level of qualitative connection with my earlier self at the time I 
committed an offense.  Yet, if our intuitions are to be trusted, I ought not to deserve punishment for 
wrongs committed during the period of my life that I cannot now remember.”). 
 149. See John Finnis, Retribution: Punishment’s Formative Aim, 44 AM. J. JURIS. 91, 101 (1999) 
(discussing retribution as an essential element of society that evenly distributes advantages and 
disadvantages within a society and viewing “punishment as retributive in aim by having the 
restoration of equality as its point: equality between the wrongdoer and the law-abiding”). 
 150. See Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718, 727 (2019); Snead, supra note 125, at 1228–29 
(explaining the possibility that a person who has forgotten parts of his life might be able to recall 
“autobiographical information” but be unable to maintain his self-identity, which is “defined (and 
disrupted) by the limits of his memory”). 
 151. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 958 (2007); see also Dresser, supra note 140, at 
429 (“For desert-based punishment to be morally defensible, reductionism demands that the person 
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B. Moral Value: Balancing Crime and Punishment 
The second tenet that the Court has considered when evaluating whether 
a class of defendants are competent to be executed is the moral value of that 
execution—whether it “offends humanity” to subject that group to capital 
punishment.152  Scholars have struggled to define the role for morality in 
capital punishment in general: some believe that death as a penalty for crime 
is morally sound in extremely limited circumstances,153 while other scholars 
have surmised that punishment is not grounded in morality at all.154  
However, many seem to agree that the morality of punishment depends on 
the proportionality between the crime committed and the punishment society 
bestows.155  As the Supreme Court has recognized, ensuring proportionality 
requires an individualized sentence for each defendant who commits a crime 
because of “[t]he nonavailability of corrective or modifying mechanisms 
with respect to an executed capital sentence.”156  In other words, the morality 
of punishment is grounded not only in the balance between the crime and the 
 
punished be psychologically related enough to the person who chose to violate the law.”). 
 152. See Panetti, 551 U.S. at 958. 
 153. See Orvill C. Snyder, Capital Punishment: The Moral Issue, 63 W. VA. L. REV. 99, 116 
(1961) (“[P]unishment of human beings by human beings cannot be morally justified on the ground 
of retribution; it can be morally justified only on the ground of the community’s moral-law right of 
self-defense.”). 
 154. See Finnis, supra note 149, at 92 (“Punishment itself, [Nietzsche] says, does not normally 
induce a sense of guilt or bad conscience. . . .  Rather, it originated in notions of equivalence 
modelled on barter and sale.  The criminal was debtor and the damaged creditor received 
compensation . . . .”). 
 155. See Dresser, supra note 140, at 420 (“By committing a crime, a person commits a wrong 
against society.  Society is then justified in inflicting a proportionate amount of suffering on that 
person.”); Leo M. Romero, Punitive Damages, Criminal Punishment, and Proportionality: The 
Importance of Legislative Limits, 41 CONN. L. REV. 109, 119 (2008) (“Punitive damages, to be 
morally justified and to conform to due process, must be limited and proportional to the wrong being 
punished.”); Snead, supra note 125, at 1251 (“In short, retributive justice requires that the 
punishment track culpability in a proportionate measure.”); Pamela A. Wilkins, Rethinking 
Categorical Prohibitions on Capital Punishment: How the Current Test Fails Mentally Ill Offenders 
and What to Do About It, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 423, 458 (2009) (“[S]omething in me recoils at the 
notion that the Constitution would permit death sentences for those not deserving death merely 
because the sentence served some utilitarian end.”). 
 156. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978); see also Louis D. Bilionis, Moral 
Appropriateness, Capital Punishment, and the Lockett Doctrine, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
283, 286 (1991) (“Execution, the harshest punishment acceptable to our society, is legitimate only 
when it can be said with confidence that it is not only a permissible legal response but also the 
morally appropriate response to the particular crime and the particular offender.”) (emphasis 
omitted). 
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punishment, but also in the consistency between the person who committed 
the crime and the person being punished.157 
Because the morality of punishment depends on particularized 
proportionality assessments for various crimes, and because the Eighth 
Amendment’s meaning changes with “evolving standards of decency,”158 the 
Supreme Court has used a case-by-case approach to ascertain whether 
society deems execution of certain types of prisoners as cruel and unusual.159  
The Court historically looks to state laws and other objective indicia of 
contemporary moral values in making this determination.160  The Madison 
Court, however, did not consider such evidence to gauge society’s judgment 
concerning the moral appropriateness of executing offenders who have no 
memory of the crime they committed.161  Instead, the Court simply 
concluded that while it “offends humanity” to execute prisoners whose 
mental illness prevents them from understanding the purpose of their 
punishment, the “offense to morality must be much less when a person’s 
mental disorder causes nothing more than an episodic memory loss.”162  
Nowhere in the opinion did the Court consider whether society agrees that 
this is a lesser moral offense.163 
 
 157. See Jennifer Leto, Extraordinary and Compelling: Madison v. Alabama and the Issue of 
Prison Reform for Elderly Prisoners, 10 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 41, 57 (2019) (“It is 
important to keep in mind that just as much as the punishment must fit the crime, the punishment 
should also fit the person.”). 
 158. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).  But see Wilkins, supra note 155, at 459–83 
(critiquing the “evolving standards” test for its failure to properly serve the proportionality 
requirement, and instead advocating a categorical approach to Eighth Amendment limitations on 
capital punishment). 
 159. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 417–18 (2008) (noting that while the Court 
had already decided capital punishment for the rape of an adult woman was unconstitutional, “it left 
open the question” of whether “other nonhomicide crimes can be punished by death consistent with 
the Eighth Amendment”). 
 160. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313 (2002) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 
584, 597 (1977)) (“[O]ur own judgment is ‘brought to bear’ by asking whether there is reason to 
disagree with the judgment reached by the citizenry and its legislators.”); Enmund v. Florida, 458 
U.S. 782, 789–94 (1982) (“Society’s rejection of the death penalty for accomplice liability in felony 
murders is . . . indicated by the sentencing decisions that juries have made [and by legislative 
judgments].”); Coker, 433 U.S. at 593 (“[W]e seek guidance in history and from the objective 
evidence of the country’s present judgment concerning the acceptability of death as a penalty for 
rape of an adult woman.”). 
 161. See Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718, 722–31 (2019) (limiting the analysis to a review of 
standards put forth in Ford v. Wainwright and Panetti v. Quarterman). 
 162. Id. at 727. 
 163. See supra notes 161–162 and accompanying text. 
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One possible explanation for the Court’s decision to forgo such analysis 
is that objective indicia of states’ judgments concerning execution of 
amnesiac prisoners simply does not exist—either because states have not 
explicitly addressed the issue, or because states that have addressed it have 
contradicted one another.164  Another possibility is that the Court believed 
inquiry into objective factors was unnecessary, because the issue in this case 
only called for an interpretation of a standard already established under Ford 
and Panetti.165  In any event, the Court was free to ignore state legislative 
judgments on the matter because the Court has discretion to disagree with 
those judgments if they conflict with the Court’s interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment.166 
Philosophers have consistently wrestled with the moral implications of 
punishing those who do not remember their crimes.167  Much like the effect 
that memory loss has on the retributive value of punishment, a lack of 
memory about the details of a crime may affect the severity of the 
punishment in the eyes of the public.168  Likewise, a penalty of death will 
feel disproportionate to an offender who does not remember his own actions 
and mental state at the time he committed the crime, even if he understands 
the factual details of the crime he once committed.169  If a defendant does not 
 
 164. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999, 1000 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274–75 (1980)) (explaining that “[s]tate sentencing 
schemes may embody different penological assumptions, making interstate comparison of sentences 
a difficult and imperfect enterprise,” but “proportionality review by federal courts should be 
informed by ‘objective factors to the maximum possible extent’”). 
 165. See Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1049 (2017) (declining to analyze objective indicia of 
societal norms concerning capital sentences for inmates with low IQ scores where the Court’s 
precedent clearly indicated that capital punishment in that context was unconstitutional). 
 166. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008) (“Whether the death penalty is 
disproportionate to the crime committed depends as well upon the standards elaborated by 
controlling precedents and by the Court’s own understanding and interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment’s text, history, meaning, and purpose.”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313 (2002) 
(“[W]e shall first review the judgment of legislatures that have addressed the suitability of imposing 
the death penalty on the mentally retarded and then consider reasons for agreeing or disagreeing with 
their judgment.”). 
 167. See, e.g., LOCKE, supra note 141, at 463–64 (“But in the Great Day, wherein the secrets of all 
hearts shall be laid open, it may be reasonable to think, no one shall be made to answer for what he 
knows nothing of . . . .”). 
 168. See Snead, supra note 125, at 1263 (“Without such memory, the punishment will seem either 
too harsh or too lenient and will not resonate with the moral sensibilities of the polity.”). 
 169. Birch, supra note 86, at 29 (“If one tries to envisage oneself spending years in prison for 
having committed some crime that one is now unable to recall and where one has no internal 
knowledge or memory of one’s motivations, reasons, character or life at the time, it is difficult to 
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remember the thoughts and feelings he was experiencing when he 
committed the crime, he likely does not associate the crime with his own 
identity.170  Consequently, putting a defendant to death who feels 
disassociated from his crime in this way offends humanity for many of the 
same reasons that the Court reached such a conclusion in Ford and 
Panetti.171 
The Court also emphasized the importance of a defendant’s self-identity 
in Enmund and Roper, where it discussed the moral implications of 
executing a defendant whose identity is disconnected from the crime.172  In 
Enmund, the Court stated that the defendant’s moral guilt is essential to his 
criminal culpability, and capital punishment would be unconstitutionally 
excessive in the absence of such guilt.173  Even if the defendant’s accomplice 
in the crime had possessed the intent to kill, the defendant’s “punishment 
must be tailored to his personal responsibility and moral guilt,” and 
therefore, sentencing him to death as punishment for a crime he did not 
intend would have been disproportionate to his moral guilt.174  This 
reasoning applies to Madison because his loss of memory and consequential 
change in identity lessened his personal responsibility and moral guilt.175  
 
believe that one could acknowledge the punishment as deserved.”). 
 170. See Snead, supra note 125, at 1241 (“[B]y sustaining personal identity, memory makes it 
possible for others to fully hold us to account for our moral obligations.”). 
 171. See Leto, supra note 157, at 57 (“It is important to make sure that the identity of the offender 
and the identity of the inmate up for execution are the same.  Madison is no longer the same man 
who committed his heinous crime.”); supra text accompanying note 162.  In Panetti v. Quarterman, 
the Court emphasized the difference between an “awareness of the State’s rationale for an 
execution” and “a rational understanding of it.”  551 U.S. 930, 959 (2007).  The Court concluded 
that a defendant should not be executed if he cannot comprehend “the meaning and purpose of the 
punishment to which he has been sentenced.”  Id. at 960.  A defendant who cannot remember his 
crime has no psychological connection to his criminal acts, and therefore his understanding of the 
“meaning and purpose” of punishment will not be the same as a defendant who remembers his 
crime.  See Dresser, supra note 140, at 413, 421–22.  Thus, a lack of memory calls this essential 
prerequisite for punishment into question.  Id. at 413 (“The weaker the psychological connection, the 
less punishment is deserved . . . .”). 
 172. See infra notes 173–180 and accompanying text. 
 173. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800 (1982) (citing Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698 
(1975)). 
 174. Id. at 801 (“Putting Enmund to death to avenge two killings that he did not commit and had 
no intention of committing or causing does not measurably contribute to the retributive end of 
ensuring that the criminal gets his just deserts.”). 
 175. Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718, 723 (2019); see also Derek Parfit, On “The Importance 
of Self-Identity”, 68 J. PHIL. 683, 686 (1971) (“[A] person’s life can be divided into the lives of 
successive selves.  This can be done where there is a marked change in character, or some other 
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Thus, Madison’s sentence does not reflect his own criminal culpability, and 
like in Enmund, the proportionality between his crime and his punishment is 
necessarily called into question.176 
In Roper, the Court similarly emphasized that “[c]apital punishment 
must be limited to those offenders . . . whose extreme culpability makes 
them ‘the most deserving of execution.’”177  The Court concluded that 
juveniles are unlikely to fall within this class of the worst-behaved 
individuals because their characters “[are] not as well formed as [those] of 
. . . adult[s],” and their personality traits are “more transitory.”178  Just as 
juveniles’ identities are fragile and leave open the possibility for reformation 
of immorality, a defendant who forgets his former criminal behavior is 
presented with an opportunity to ameliorate his character.179  Thus, 
extending the reasoning of Roper to Madison might have led to a different 
result, as there remained hope that Madison’s identity might be changed and 
his morality retrieved.180 
Another challenge to proportionality arises from the argument that 
dementia may itself be its own punishment, and therefore adding death as a 
 
lessening in psychological connectedness.”). 
 176. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801. 
 177. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 
(2002)). 
 178. Id. at 570 (“From a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor 
with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be 
reformed.”). 
 179. Dresser, supra note 140, at 446 (“Reductionism invites serious dialogue about what 
psychological connectedness and continuity qualify as a morally defensible basis for retributive, 
deterrent, and incapacitative punishment.  It urges consideration as to what sorts of rehabilitative 
programs might be effective [for defendants who are psychologically disconnected from their 
crimes].”). 
 180. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 570, 573 (“An unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or 
cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments based on youth 
as a matter of course, even where the juvenile offender’s objective immaturity, vulnerability, and 
lack of true depravity should require a sentence less severe than death.”).  This holds true in 
Madison’s case, where the facts of his past crime might interfere with a faithful application of the 
competency standard.  See, e.g., Kelsey Stein, Who is Vernon Madison? Alabama Cop-Killer Facing 
Execution Has Claimed Insanity, Incompetence, AL.COM (JAN. 13, 2019), https://www.al. 
com/news/2016/05/who_is_vernon_madison_alabama.html (quoting Judge McRae, who described 
Madison as “a man whose life history is but one sequel after another of violent, assaultive acts 
against other human beings and total disregard for our laws” when sentencing Madison to death).  
Judge McRae sentenced Madison to death despite the jury’s recommendation of life without parole.  
Id.  Judge McRae has overridden “six jury recommendations for life without parole to impose a 
death sentence, the most of any judge in Alabama.”  Id. 
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penalty tips the scales of crime and punishment out of balance.181  The Ford 
Court briefly raised this issue, but Panetti offered no insight as to its 
validity; therefore, the Madison Court did not address it when deciding the 
constitutionality of executing a defendant with vascular dementia.182  
However, scholars have since pondered over the effect that such mental 
illness has on punishments—particularly when a prisoner’s living conditions 
contribute to the illness.183  Prison conditions are understandably harsh, but 
there is also an absence of corrective treatment when those conditions lead 
to cognitive decline.184  While this argument may apply with less force when 
the punishment the defendant suffered is memory loss rather than a loss of 
all cognitive sense, it is nevertheless certain that: 1) the argument of 
cognitive decline as sufficient punishment was considered in Ford,185 and 
2) prison conditions do contribute to cognitive decline.186  Therefore, 
because mental decline adds an additional layer of punishment onto a prison 
sentence, courts should at least address a defendant’s enduring cognitive 
decline—in any form—when weighing the severity of a crime against the 
 
 181. Cf. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 407 (1986) (“It is also said that execution serves no 
purpose in these cases because madness is its own punishment . . . .”). 
 182. See id.  See generally Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718, 722–31 (2019) (lacking any 
reference to insanity being a punishment on its own); Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 934–62 
(2007) (acknowledging that Ford brought up the point as a factor but neglecting to expound on it). 
 183. See, e.g., Patrick A. Dawson & J. David Putnal, Ford v. Wainwright: Eighth Amendment 
Prohibits Execution of the Insane, 38 MERCER L. REV. 949, 968 (1987) (discussing collateral issues 
raised by Ford, such as “how [the state will deal] with prison conditions that may be fostering poor 
mental health among inmates”).  Similarly, the status of “death row inmate” often causes 
psychological torment and mental decline.  See Douglas Mossman, Assessing and Restoring 
Competency to be Executed: Should Psychiatrists Participate?, 5 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 397, 398 (1987) 
(discussing how the “extreme physical and emotional stress” capital inmates experience from sitting 
on death row often causes psychosis in prisoners); Quinn Carlson, Madison v. Alabama: The 
Unfulfilled Promise of Ford, 97 DENV. L. REV. 597, 616–17 (2020). 
 184. James R. P. Ogloff et. al., Mental Health Services in Jails and Prisons: Legal, Clinical, and 
Policy Issues, 18 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 109, 125, 134 (1994) (noting that correctional facilities 
have failed to effectively respond to mentally ill prisoners’ treatment needs, and discussing the “high 
prevalence of [mentally ill offenders] in jails and prisons of the United States,” who “face significant 
hurdles as they endure the routine challenges of dealing with mental illness while in prison” and are 
“more likely to be victimized by other offenders”). 
 185. Ford, 477 U.S. at 407. 
 186. See Ruthanne DeWolfe & Alan S. DeWolfe, Impact of Prison Conditions on the Mental 
Health of Inmates, 4 S. ILL. U. L.J. 497, 501 (1979) (“Courts have gradually recognized that there is 
some relationship between prison conditions, emotional and mental states, and destructive 
behavior.”). 
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severity of the punishment.187 
As the Ford Court acknowledged, scholars have long believed that 
humanity demands an execution be stayed if a defendant becomes of 
“nonsane memory.”188  Contextually, the word “memory” may have been 
intended to refer to the mind generally rather than its modern understanding 
as the ability to store information,189 but the connection between memory 
and the mind’s other faculties makes the sentiment applicable to memory 
loss as well.190  The Eighth Amendment has at its core a “basic concept of 
human dignity,” and it demands that capital punishment be reserved for 
defendants with the most extreme culpability because execution is “unique 
in its severity and irrevocability.”191  A defendant who has lost his memory 
of the crime has lessened culpability because his psychological connection 
to the criminal act is diminished, and he can therefore only ever understand 
the crime and his punishment in the abstract.192  Thus, the moral principles 
of the Eighth Amendment cannot support a sentence of death for a defendant 
who has no memory of the crime he committed.193 
Madison’s holding fails to address how the change in identity caused by 
 
 187. See Dunn v. Madison, 138 S. Ct. 9, 13 (2017) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[W]e may well have 
to consider the ways in which lengthy periods of imprisonment between death sentence and 
execution can deepen the cruelty of the death penalty while at the same time undermining its 
penological rationale.”); see also Bilionis, supra note 156, at 328 (“Nowhere is it written that a state 
has a right to be unwary of the Constitution’s demands, particularly when the state seeks to take the 
life of one of its citizens.”). 
 188. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406–07 (1986) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *24–25). 
 189. Jack C. Schoenholtz et al., The “Legal” Abuse of Physicians in Deaths in the United States: 
The Erosion of Ethics and Morality in Medicine, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1505, 1596 (1996) (quoting 
Memory, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 985 (6th ed. 1990)) (alteration in original) (“[T]he word 
[‘memory’] as used in Blackstone and other ancient authorities, appeared to be synonymous with 
‘mind’, [sic] whereas the word ‘memory’, [sic] in modern times is used in a more restricted sense of 
recollection of past events rather than the general state of one’s mental power.”). 
 190. Id. at 1594–98 (discussing the interconnectedness between memory and the mind). 
 191. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182–87 (1976) (first citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 
(1958) (plurality opinion); then citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286–91 (Brennan, J., 
concurring); and then citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
 192. See Parfit, supra note 175, at 687 (“When we think about an earlier part of our lives, we can 
reflect upon the weakening, over time, in psychological connectedness.  Such reflections may 
produce in us a kind of detachment.  We can then say, ‘That was only my past self.’”). 
 193. Brief for Petitioner at 27, Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718 (2019) (No. 17-7505) (“For 
purposes of retribution, there is no moral or constitutional distinction between a person who cannot 
‘recogni[ze] . . . the severity of the offense’ as a result of delusions and a person who is unable to do 
so as a result of dementia, cognitive decline, and memory deficits.”). 
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memory loss in turn affects a defendant’s rational understanding of his 
crime.194  Consequently, this oversight poses a threat to Eighth Amendment 
protections because the execution of a defendant who does not remember 
committing the crime cannot be justified by either retributive values195 or 
moral arguments of proportionality.196 
V. LOOKING FORWARD: HOW WILL MADISON AFFECT COMPETENCY 
DETERMINATIONS? 
The Madison Court applied the competency standard developed under 
Panetti to reach its conclusion, emphasizing that Panetti focused on 
cognitive inability—specifically, inability to rationally understand a state’s 
reason for execution—rather than which mental conditions may cause that 
inability.197  The Court in Madison held that “simpl[e] forgetful[ness]” alone 
is insufficient to render a defendant incompetent, but it also acknowledged 
that forgetfulness might be enough if it causes a lack of rational 
understanding of the death sentence.198  But, as the Panetti Court recognized, 
“a concept like rational understanding is difficult to define.”199  Madison’s 
proposition—that a defendant can rationally understand the connection 
between his crime and the punishment imposed even when the defendant has 
 
 194. See Madison, 139 S. Ct. at 726–27 (explaining the Court’s reasoning without examination of 
the identity question described). 
 195. See supra Section IV.A. 
 196. See supra Section IV.B. 
 197. Madison, 139 S. Ct. at 728 (“[Panetti’s] standard focuses on whether a mental disorder has 
had a particular effect: an inability to rationally understand why the State is seeking execution.”). 
 198. Id. at 727–29.  The Court provided examples for when dementia may be sufficient to cause a 
lack of rational understanding, such as “when a person has difficulty preserving any memories, so 
that even newly gained knowledge (about, say, the crime and punishment) will be quickly forgotten.  
Or . . . when cognitive deficits prevent the acquisition of such knowledge at all, so that memory gaps 
go forever uncompensated.”  Id. at 728. 
 199. Panetti v. Quartman, 551 U.S. 930, 959 (2007).  The Court then noted that the “lack of 
rational understanding” standard is not satisfied when any defendant is “so callous as to be 
unrepentant; so self-centered and devoid of compassion as to lack all sense of guilt; so adept in 
transferring blame to others as to be considered, at least in the colloquial sense, to be out of touch 
with reality.”  Id. at 960.  Rather, a “severe, documented mental illness” will mark “[t]he beginning 
of doubt about competence in a case.”  Id.; see also Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Competence, 
Rational Understanding, and the Criminal Defendant, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1375, 1375 (2006) 
(“Though it is well established that, to be competent, a criminal defendant must have a ‘rational’ as 
well as ‘factual’ understanding of her situation, the meaning of such ‘rational understanding’ has 
gone largely undefined.”). 
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no memory of committing the crime—makes the term even more elusive, 
and it is likely that courts will have difficulty applying Madison’s holding.200 
Although Madison attempted to simplify Panetti’s solution to 
determining competency to be executed, scholars have often criticized 
Panetti’s vague use of the term “rational understanding” because it has 
allowed courts to virtually ignore the requirement altogether, so long as a 
capital defendant is aware of the State’s reason for execution.201  Some 
scholars propose a categorical ban of execution in all cases involving 
mentally ill defendants.202  However, the primary objection to Panetti’s 
elusive standard is its failure to offer any real solution for how to proceed 
when the psychological complexity of mental illness, the philosophical 
complexity and importance of capital punishment, and the difficulty of 
defining “rational understanding” intersect, despite the opinion’s 
acknowledgment of these issues.203 
After Madison, the competency determination has become even more 
complicated; now, psychological experts must distinguish between 
defendants with memory loss who can “rationally” conceptualize the 
connection between a crime they committed and the State’s death sentence 
from those who cannot.204  It is true that some ethical dilemmas may be more 
 
 200. Cf. Steiker, supra note 14, at 290 (discussing the “tensions and uncertainties” that the Panetti 
standard creates and arguing that it raises “global questions about the proper scope of Eighth 
Amendment constraints on punishment and the methodology for determining that scope”). 
 201. See Blume, supra note 11, at 341 (footnote omitted) (“Some courts have interpreted Panetti 
as imposing an additional requirement of a rational understanding of death and the reasons for 
execution in determining competency to be executed, but for the most part, courts have held that 
Panetti only reiterated Ford’s requirements.”). 
 202. See, e.g., Wilkins, supra note 155, at 476–79 (describing a categorical ban on capital 
punishment for prisoners with psychotic disorders).  Of course, there are also scholars who have 
suggested the possibility of a categorical approach in the other direction, in opposition to the 
holdings of Ford and Panetti.  See Steiker, supra note 14, at 296 (“What if a different Supreme 
Court were to conclude that the rationale of Ford was simply wrong, that there are good reasons to 
execute those who have become incompetent while awaiting execution (reasons that might flow 
from incapacitation, deterrence, or retribution of some sort or another)?”). 
 203. Michael Mello, Executing the Mentally Ill—When Is Someone Sane Enough to Die?, 22 
CRIM. JUST. 30, 31 (2007) (“If the mentally ill shouldn’t be put to death, what is the correct standard 
for measuring execution competency; what kinds of mental illness ‘count’?  Who should set that 
standard?  Who—employing what procedural vehicles—should decide whether a particular prisoner 
is sane enough to die? . . .  The problem of the intersection between mental illness and capital 
punishment isn’t rocket science.  It’s much harder than that.”). 
 204. Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718, 728 (2019) (citing Panetti, 551 U.S. at 962) 
(emphasizing that “neurologists, psychologists, and other experts can contribute to a court’s 
understanding” of issues involving mental competency and rational understanding). 
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easily avoided when a defendant’s competency evaluation concerns loss of 
memory rather than psychotic delusions, such as his ability to consent to the 
evaluation.205  However, other issues at the heart of the rational 
understanding requirement become significantly more difficult to 
evaluate.206  One scholar, for example, argues that a defendant’s emotional 
appreciation of a criminal act and its consequences are essential for rational 
understanding.207  As previously discussed, emotional appreciation of these 
concepts is called into question when a defendant has lost his memory of the 
crime because the defendant no longer psychologically identifies with the 
person he was when he committed the crime.208 
Madison itself reflects the obstacles its opinion creates through its 
reasoning for remanding the case back to state court to determine whether 
Madison is currently competent to be executed.209  The Court acknowledged 
that the state court’s original ruling in 2016 stated the correct standard—that 
Madison had a rational understanding under Panetti—but it worried that the 
state court reached this determination by simply concluding that Madison 
was not delusional.210  It directed the state court to reassess whether 
Madison’s dementia prevents him from rationally understanding why he is 
to be executed, assuring that the state court could “evaluate such matters 
better.”211  While the Court suggested earlier in its opinion that dementia 
may cause incompetency where newly gained information is “quickly 
forgotten” or where “memory gaps go forever uncompensated,”212 it failed to 
expand upon what kind of memory retention is necessary for a defendant to 
satisfy the rational understanding requirement.213 
What if a defendant retains only a semantic memory of the crime, such 
 
 205. Mark A. Small & Randy K. Otto, Evaluations of Competency to Be Executed: Legal 
Contours and Implications for Assessment, 18 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 146, 152 (1991) (“[I]t may be 
that the difficulties which led someone to question the prisoner’s competency to be executed may 
also compromise his competency to consent to the psychological evaluation.”). 
 206. See infra notes 207–208 and accompanying text. 
 207. Maroney, supra note 199, at 1405–06. 
 208. Dresser, supra note 135140, at 426 (“The person punished must be psychologically related to 
the offender, and must continue to have enough of the culpable mental state to justify attribution of 
responsibility and the infliction of punishment.”). 
 209. See  Madison, 139 S. Ct. at 729–31. 
 210. Id. at 730. 
 211. Id. at 731. 
 212. See id. at 727–28 (discussing how memory loss affects a Panetti analysis). 
 213. Id. at 731 (stating that the Court “express[es] no view” on whether the defendant reached a 
“rational understanding”). 
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that he can remember factually that he committed a crime when shown 
pictures of the scene or of the weapon he used, but cannot remember the 
experience of committing the crime?214  What if a defendant’s memory is 
damaged such that he can only remember information for a week at a time—
is this what the Court considers to be information that is “quickly 
forgotten?”215  Madison left the resolution of these difficult issues largely in 
the hands of experts before the lower courts and the findings they choose to 
emphasize, which raises ethical concerns for psychiatrists as to the extent of 
their participation in execution proceedings.216  It is also likely that lower 
courts may avoid addressing these issues involving the relationship between 
memory and rational understanding altogether, as they have avoided 
undergoing a general rational understanding analysis up to this point by 
simply adopting the psychological findings and interpretations of either 
party’s expert.217 
Rather than further complicate the competency standard by asking 
 
 214. See Snead, supra note 125, at 1207–08 (describing a patient whose semantic memory was 
intact and who could remember his address and the location of his parents’ vacation home, but 
whose damaged episodic memory prevented him from remembering any experiences of his own 
life). 
 215. See Madison, 139 S. Ct. at 728 (neglecting to define “quickly forgotten”); see also Snead, 
supra note 125, at 1226 (footnote omitted) (“Memory—including the activities of encoding, 
remembering, and forgetting—is indispensable to the essential and distinctive activities of human 
life . . . .”). 
 216. See Loren H. Roth, The Council on Psychiatry and Law, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY. 411, 412 
(1987) (“There is uncertainty about whether it is ethical for psychiatrists to participate in death row 
evaluations . . . .  After much discussion, the council was unable to agree, on the basis of principle, 
whether psychiatric participation in the evaluation and treatment of persons sentenced to execution is 
consistent with ethical standards.”).  But see Douglas Mossman, supra note 183, at 407 
(“Psychiatrists . . . need not feel that pragmatic solutions to fulfilling the tasks assigned to them by 
execution competency statutes will necessarily involve compromising professional standards.”). 
While professional psychological evaluations are necessary in order to determine competency 
to be executed, the problem seems to be that courts have come to rely too heavily on these 
evaluations, and have abandoned their independent duty to apply legal standards to the psychological 
findings.  See Melissa L. Cox & Patricia A. Zapf, An Investigation of Discrepancies Between Mental 
Health Professionals and the Courts in Decisions About Competency, 28 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 
109, 131 (2004) (proposing greater education for judges on the interplay between psychology and 
legal competency standards). 
 217. See supra note 216 and accompanying text; see also Wood v. Thaler, 787 F. Supp. 2d 458, 
496–97 (W.D. Tex. 2011) (adopting the opinions of the respondent’s expert that the petitioner’s 
belief that the prosecutor and the sentencing court were conspiring against him was “simply a means 
of ‘rationalizing’ [his] current situation[]”), aff’d, 619 F. App’x. 304 (5th Cir. 2015).  This is 
particularly likely in light of the fact that Madison failed to provide a concrete standard for 
evaluating memory’s effect on rational understanding.  See Madison, 139 S. Ct. at 731. 
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psychiatrists and other experts to determine whether a defendant who has no 
memory of his crime can still have a rational understanding of the 
connection between the crime and punishment, the Court should have 
adopted a categorical prohibition of capital punishment for defendants who 
cannot remember their crimes.218  In University of Detroit Professor Pamela 
Wilkins’s assessment of current Eighth Amendment and capital punishment 
jurisprudence, she recognizes a “double bind” that makes it difficult for the 
Court to implement categorical bans on executing certain classes of 
individuals.219  Specifically, she recognizes that certain conditions that make 
defendants less culpable also make defendants (at least appear) to be more 
dangerous, and juries often give more weight to the future dangerousness of 
defendants than to the defendant’s reduced culpability.220  While this 
phenomenon might not be problematic when focusing on retributive values 
of punishment in isolation, it becomes problematic when considering 
whether it leads to a punishment that is greater than what the defendant 
actually deserves.221 
To address this bind, Wilkins proposes a new test for determining when 
a categorical prohibition is appropriate for a certain class of individuals.222  
The test has four conditions that must be met: 1) the class members must 
have a particular condition that is not chosen by the class members or 
defined by their past experiences; 2) the condition must be significantly 
mitigating (meaning it substantially reduces the individual’s culpability); 
3) the mitigating condition must indicate (or could be understood by a jury 
to indicate) an enhanced possibility of future dangerousness; and 4) there 
must be a substantial risk that the jury will weigh the possibility of future 
 
 218. See Wilkins, supra note 155, at 483 (“Contrary to what some might claim, the incoherence of 
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on categorical prohibitions is not a good or sufficient reason to 
eliminate such prohibitions altogether.”). 
 219. Id. at 426. 
 220. Id. at 426–27 (describing the difficulties defendants face when juries perceive them as 
dangerous). 
 221. Id. at 430 (“A deserts-limitation view of the Eighth Amendment insists upon the primacy of 
retribution: utilitarian arguments about deterrence and incapacitation must yield in the face of 
deserts-based arguments.”). 
 222. Id. at 470.  Wilkins’ test intends to counteract juries’ tendency to weigh the potential future 
dangerousness of a defendant more heavily than the defendant’s reduced culpability.  Id. (footnote 
omitted) (“[I]s there a substantial risk that when the characteristics of a condition point 
simultaneously to significantly reduced culpability and to future dangerousness, the jury will give 
more weight to the future dangerousness issue than to the moral deserts issue?”). 
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dangerousness more heavily than the defendant’s reduced culpability.223  If 
all of these conditions are met, then a categorical exclusion is appropriate.224 
Applying this test to Madison’s case, a categorical prohibition on 
executing defendants who cannot remember their crime should be 
implemented because these defendants have significantly reduced 
culpability,225 yet juries could interpret their memory loss as enhancing the 
possibility of their future dangerousness.226  The risk that juries might give 
more weight to the potential for future dangerousness than to the defendant’s 
lessened culpability is substantiated by Madison’s case itself.227  The Court 
should therefore implement a categorical ban to protect defendants who 
completely lose memory of their crime, to prevent courts—and juries—from 
levying the ultimate punishment against defendants who do not deserve it.228 
As the Justices recognized during oral argument in Madison, some 
commentators argue that allowing memory loss to prevent execution would 
cause a substantial increase in defendants who falsely claim that they cannot 
 
 223. Id. at 470–71. 
 224. See id. at 471.  As Wilkins notes, this test for categorical bans is more constitutionally sound 
than having no categorical bans because without them, the defendant bears the risk that he may be 
sentenced to death due to a condition that seems dangerous, even though the condition makes him 
less deserving of death.  Id. at 476.  While the Constitution prohibits excessive punishments, it is 
ambivalent towards potential under-punishment of defendants protected by the categorical ban.  Id. 
 225. See supra Section IV.A. 
 226. See Snead, supra note 125, at 1261 (explaining that because memory loss causes a disruption 
in personal identity, predicting how a previously violent person will act in the future after suffering 
from memory loss becomes very difficult).  While a defendant whose identity is altered by memory 
loss “may very well refrain from repeating prior bad acts,” id., it is easy to envision how a jury might 
interpret a capital defendant’s loss of memory—as making him more unpredictable or indifferent 
towards his previous crimes.  See JOEL NORRIS, SERIAL KILLERS 239–40 (1989) (explaining how 
memory loss and head trauma are frequently associated with “individuals who are at risk of 
becoming episodically violent, even if there is no diagnosed brain malfunction”). 
 227. Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718, 724 (2019).  After a competency hearing, the trial court 
had found Madison competent to be executed despite his argument that he could no longer 
remember his crime.  Id. 
 228. See Wilkins, supra note 155, at 483 (concluding that the Supreme Court should shift its 
currently inconsistent Eighth Amendment inquiry to a standard that focuses primarily on deserts). 
In response to the outcome of Madison, Quinn Carlson similarly proposes a categorical ban on 
the execution of a class of defendants that would include Madison.  See Carlson, supra note 183, at 
618.  That proposal, however, focuses on defendants who have been “diagnosed with a mental 
illness that, by definition, impairs [their] cognitive capacity.”  Id.  Because this Note concludes, 
however, that the relationship between memory loss and self-identity is the precise trigger that 
lessens a defendant’s culpability, its proposal applies to all defendants who lose memory of their 
crimes, rather than defendants who are diagnosed with a mental illness that impairs cognitive 
capacity.  See supra notes 225–226 and accompanying text. 
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remember their crimes.229  However, this outcome is unlikely for two 
reasons: First, a similar fear of frivolous claims arose when Ford created a 
claim for incompetency due to mental illness, but the number of inmates 
who filed claims of incompetency after Ford was close to the number of 
inmates found to have a severe mental illness.230  Second, true memory loss, 
whether brought on by dementia or amnesia or some other mental illness, is 
a measurable affliction that defendants can prove in court.231  Thus, while it 
may be easy for defendants to file frivolous claims of incompetency based 
on memory loss, an influx of frivolous claims seems unlikely, and any 
frivolous claim filed will have a low chance of success.232 
Around 2,500 prisoners are currently sitting on death row.233  In 2019, 
“at least 19 of the 22 executed prisoners” suffered from either mental illness, 
intellectual disability, or severe trauma.234  The use of capital punishment in 
America “continue[s] to wither,”235 but for those whose execution dates 
 
 229. See supra note 99 (discussing oral argument in Madison).  This fear parallels the fear felt by 
many when the Court developed a standard for mental competency in the first place.  See Ford v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 435 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The defendant has already had a 
full trial on the issue of guilt, and a trial on the issue of penalty; the requirement of still a third 
adjudication offers an invitation to those who have nothing to lose by accepting it to advance entirely 
spurious claims of insanity.”). 
 230. See Blume, supra note 11, at 353–56 (examining “the assumption of a floodgate of claims” 
based on mental incompetency and finding that the number of Ford claims filed reflected the 
number of inmates with severe mental illness, that those inmates who did file a Ford claim had a 
relatively high success rate, and that a large percentage of Ford claimants had a history of mental 
illness).  The same result occurred after Atkins created a claim for incompetency due to mental 
retardation, as only 7% of inmates subsequently filed Atkins claims, and 40% of those claims were 
successful.  See id. at 353. 
 231. See, e.g., Andrea Schaffner, Understanding Dementia, 23 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 372, 375–
76 (2010) (discussing the various stages of dementia and comparing subjective complaints of 
memory deficit with objective evidence of memory decline through clinical examination); see also 
O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the “Complexity” of Capital Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1265, 1290 (2007) (discussing the eventual use of neuroimaging in the courtroom to evaluate 
memory). 
 232. See Blume, supra note 11, at 353–56 (“If the old adage that you can indict a ham sandwich is 
true (and it is), that same ham sandwich would also almost certainly be found competent to stand 
trial.”). 
 233. Death Row, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row/overview 
(last visited Sept. 25, 2020). 
 234. The Death Penalty in 2019: Year End Report, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. 16, 
https://files.deathpenaltyinfo.org/reports/year-end/YearEndReport2019.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 
2020). 
 235. Id. at 2.  According to this report, the use of the death penalty in 2019 remained “near 
historic lows,” with the imposition of only 34 new death sentences.  Id.  This marks “the second-
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approach, a clarification of the rational understanding test could mean the 
difference between life and death.236  The Court should revisit the 
competency standard before another life is taken in vain.237 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Society reserves capital punishment for offenders with the highest level 
of culpability, when retribution can be best accomplished with their deaths 
and moral values cannot justify preserving their lives.238  When a defendant 
retains no memory of the crime for which he has been sentenced at the time 
of his execution, however, the defendant will never have the last minute 
recognition of “the gravity of his crime[s]” that society desires when seeking 
punishment.239  Similarly, a defendant who lacks the requisite level of 
psychological connectedness to the crime inherently carries less culpability, 
which makes execution a disproportionately severe punishment.240  
Moreover, the Court’s imprecise distinction between memory loss alone and 
memory loss that prevents a rational understanding of the crime makes the 
phrase even more elusive and causes increasing difficulty for lower courts in 
 
lowest number [of death sentences issued] in the modern era of capital punishment.”  Id. 
 236. See Leto, supra note 157, at 46 (“The implications of the Madison decision will have a 
lasting impact on the criminal justice system.  This opinion will echo throughout prisons all over the 
country.”). 
 237. See id. at 59 (“To kill a man, who does not remember his crime, his trial, the victim, and 
maybe even himself, is a merciless killing.”). 
 238. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 476 (2012) (“[T]he death penalty is reserved only for the 
most culpable defendants committing the most serious offenses.”); see also Panetti v. Quarterman, 
551 U.S. 930, 958 (2007) (explaining that capital punishment is used to help the offender recognize 
the wrongness of his crime and to impose the penalty society views as justified). 
 239. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 958; see also Birch, supra note 86, at 28 (“A person who is unable to 
recollect the moral attitudes and beliefs she held at the time of the offense and the decisional process 
by which she came to commit it . . . is not capable of contrition or repentance.”).  Professor Birch 
also compares the relationship between memory of a crime and deservedness of a punishment to the 
relationship between memory of a good deed and deservedness of a reward.  See id. at 25.  He argues 
that just as people would gain less satisfaction from public praise for a good deed that they 
completed but cannot remember, they would feel less regret from punishment for a crime for which 
they have no recollection.  Id. 
 240. Dresser, supra note 140, at 432 (“In at least some cases, the customary punishment for a past 
offense is inappropriate because the person now lacks some or all of the psychological features 
which formerly justified punishment.”); see Romero, supra note 155, at 129–30 (stating that when 
evaluating the proportionality between crime and punishment, courts focus on the culpability and 
mental state of the defendant rather than the harm caused). 
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applying the correct competency standard.241 
The Eighth Amendment was created to ensure not only that society has 
a say in how criminals are treated, but also to serve as a check on society 
when its penological desires overstep the limits of morality.242  In Madison, 
the Court failed to address any objective indicia of whether society agrees 
with capital punishment for defendants who cannot remember their 
crimes.243  More importantly, however, the Court refused to consider the 
intricacies of the connection between memory and psychological continuity 
and how that connection affects the retributive and moral values sought 
through capital punishment.244  Madison instead left us with an elusive 
standard that places the ever-ambiguous “rational understanding” test at its 
core.245  Unfortunately, until the Court recognizes the inseverable bond 
between memory and identity, communities will continue to hand out death 
sentences that leave their retributive desires unsatisfied, and defendants will 
continue to die without the subjective understanding of crime and 




 241. See, e.g., Malone, supra note 18, at 158 (“According to the Alabama Attorney General . . . 
Madison’s conviction was justified because he ‘understood what he was accused of and how the 
state planned to punish him.’  Is that a ‘rational understanding’ of the execution?” (internal footnote 
omitted)). 
 242. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182 (1976) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)) 
(“As we have seen . . . the Eighth Amendment demands more than that a challenged punishment be 
acceptable to contemporary society.  The Court also must ask whether it comports with the basic 
concept of human dignity at the core of the Amendment.”). 
 243. See supra notes 158–163 and accompanying text. 
 244. See supra Sections IV.A, IV.B. 
 245. See Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718, 731 (2019) (quoting Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 
U.S. 930, 958 (2007)); see also Steiker, supra note 14, at 300 (“Hard as it may be to decide what a 
‘rational understanding’ of a death sentence entails, it is even harder to envision the day when it will 
be clear what constitutes a ‘rational understanding’ of [the] Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence.”). 
 246. See Dresser, supra note 140, at 446 (discussing the need for “serious dialogue about what 
psychological connectedness and continuity qualify as a morally defensible basis for retributive, 
deterrent, and incapacitative punishment,” and concluding that “[i]t is up to us as persons to decide” 
how to incorporate our enhanced understanding of persons over time into our rules and practices). 
 * J.D. Candidate, Pepperdine University Caruso School of Law; B.A., University of California, 
Irvine.  Thank you to the members of Pepperdine Law Review for your dedication and precision 
throughout the editing process.  I would also like to thank my friends and family for their 
unwavering support and contributions to my sanity during these most trying times. 
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